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The session focused on the classification of international armed conflicts
(IACs) and non-international armed conflicts (NIACs) and the subtle
distinctions in those classifications that can substantially affect the rules of
conflict. In particular, the session dealt with the aspect of consent, or lack
thereof, of territorial States to allow another state to use force within its
territory, and how that quasi-invasion affects conflict classification. In 2016
Commentaries on the Geneva Conventions, the ICRC holds the position that
the general rule of conflict classification applies, consent is a critical and
dispositive principle, and that international humanitarian law (IHL) is
independent of the legality of the use of force and jus ad bellum.1 The panel
discussed the implications of giving consent such a weighted position in the
determination of conflict classification.
Determining whether a conflict is an IAC or a NIAC matters, for
example, when attempting to prosecute people for war crimes and when
determining what aid to give combatants and non-combatants while the
conflict is ongoing.2 Different rules apply depending on the classification. If
a conflict is classified as an IAC, it will be governed by the first through
fourth Geneva Conventions and Additional Protocol 1. If a conflict is
classified as a NIAC, it will be governed by Common Article 3, and
Additional Protocol 2.
In modern conflicts, it is increasingly common for a State to occupy
another State’s territory and carry out military operations in that State. These
operations are often directed at non-State armed groups who are in a preexisting NIAC with the territorial State. The most common modern example
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of this phenomena is ISIS in Syria.3 During the discussion, the relevance of
consent was highlighted with regards to this type of operation. The 2016
Commentaries suggest that the presence or absence of consent is essential for
delineating the applicable legal framework between the territorial State and
the intervening State. One panelist noted that should the second State’s
intervention be carried out without the consent of the territorial State, it
would amount to an IAC between the intervening State and the territorial
State. This is the case even if the intervening State’s conduct is not directed
at the territorial State’s government or infrastructure.
One of the panelists, a specialist on the subject of classification, agrees
with the ICRC that the general rule applies in conflict classification. The use
of force triggers an IAC, to which the law of armed conflict applies. In
discussing classification, the goal of these laws should be remembered,
which is to protect civilians and armed forces from harm and to punish
unruly forces who may not otherwise be penalized. While most panelists
agreed that consent should be considered in determining the status of the
relationship between the intervening State and the territorial State, many felt
it should not be the sole consideration. Even if affirmative consent of the
territorial State is dispositive of the lack of an international armed conflict
between the two groups, lack of consent should not similarly be treated as
dispositive. Sovereignty, similarly, is incorrectly objected to as a reason why
an IAC is triggered when an armed conflict violates a State’s sphere of
sovereignty; the panelist felt that the invocation of a State’s sphere of
sovereignty is a correct consideration if we want to understand what it means
when two States are in conflict, because a State is its sovereignty.
One panelist stressed the importance of fact-specific conflict
classification. They insisted that state practice is missing in the ICRC
proposal for conflict classification. Though it is unclear how we should
marry the concepts, if you are an outside state, consent matters, as there are
sovereignty issues at stake that are highlighted in the 2016 Commentary. To
determine if an international armed conflict exists between a territorial State
and an intervening State, one could look at whom the intervening State is
exercising force against. If the intervening State is using force against the
government or the government infrastructure, an international armed conflict
then exists between those two States. As another alternative to considering
consent alone, one could consider the intent of the intervening state.
However, this comes with the additional difficulty of determining intent.
Moreover, such an inquiry conflicts with the text and intention of the 2016
Commentary.
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There are a number of practical concerns pointed out by panelists that
serve as reasons for diminishing the current role of consent in the 2016
Commentary. The current language creates an odd result in which an IAC is
immediately created between an intervening State and a territorial State even
if the only actual conflict is occurring between the intervening state and a
non-state actor operating in the territory.4 In such a case there would be an
IAC between the territorial State and the intervening state, but, until the
requisite level of intensity is met between the intervening state and the nonstate actor, no recognized conflict would exist between them. This creates
serious gaps in protection.
On the other hand, if consent is not given a controlling role, another
serious gap would be created. For example, if a territorial State does not or
cannot immediately respond to a use of force on its territory, during the
intervening period between the initial use of force and the point at which it
responds, there is not an IAC. Politics can, also, be a complicating factor in
determining consent. A state can have legitimate reasons for stating one
thing publicly, and agreeing to another behind closed doors.
One panelist suggested that too much time was spent on debating the
classification of conflict. LOAC should not be concerned with the lawfulness
of the conflict, but rather focused on the victims of the conflict. Also, there are
other legal frameworks to look to such as domestic State law, human rights
law, and those may actually provide more protections than IHL.
One panelist was concerned that consent has different meanings. For
example, how do you gain consent to enter territory that is no longer in the
State’s control? Where a State has lost territory, you still need to ask their
consent. An IAC does not have to mean there is aggression; you often have to
characterize and classify the situation in different terms. Relatedly, when there
is a NIAC, it does not automatically mean there is violation of jus ad bellum.
Consent should play a role in determining classifying conflict, though
there was not universal agreement as to how controlling consent should be in
determining IACs or NIACs. However, it can be difficult to determine
whether consent exists. Further, there may be additional considerations
relative to the withdrawal or lack of consent as it relates to conflict
classification. At least several of the panelists agree that State sovereignty is
a proper consideration in conflict classification. Overall, the focus on
consent is an attempt to provide a clear standard. The panel agreed that an
unclear standard can allow groups to take advantage of a situation and put
civilians at risk.
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